The Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) has been one of the most popular stream ciphers for providing symmetric key encryption, and is now proposed as an efficient cipher within light-weight cryptography. As an algorithm it has been considered to be one of the fastest stream ciphers and one of the easiest to implement. Unfortunately, despite its simplicity of usage, a number of attacks on it have been found. Therefore, various improvements of this algorithm exist in cryptography, but none of them use proper randomness. This paper outlines modified version of RC4 and which has the desirable features of an efficient stream cipher algorithm, and which integrates the Symmetric Random Function Generator (SRFG) method. Though RC4 uses pseudorandom features with an initialisation vector and a seed value, the use of true randomness in RC4 is novel in this domain. Therefore, this paper proposes a modified RC4 as MRC4, and which then evaluates the statistical features of MRC4 based upon parameters such as non-linearity, resiliency, balancedness, propagation and immunity. Further, we have compared the security features and confusiondiffusion attributes with some recent variants of RC4 and have found that MRC4 is efficient in withstanding against attacks. The experimental results show that MRC4 supports a 60% better confusion property and 50% better diffusion as compared to the original RC4 method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography provides a fundamental security layer for data and secure services [1] . With the rise of IoT, we need improved cryptographic algorithms which are efficient in terms of security and computational complexity [2] - [4] . Designing such algorithms thus requires a number of considerations, such as key size, message size, functionality, and randomness. A key management system includes its selection, usage and background algorithm as one of the critical factors in cryptography. A weak key, or the weak algorithm with a strong key, can cause an exploitation of the ciphertext, and thus reveal the plaintext.
Along with the development of the ciphers, cryptanalysis is attractive to cryptography designers as it can identify vulnerabilities in the ciphers for further improvement.
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The structural design of cryptography algorithms and their corresponding technical functions are thus important considerations [5] . Logic gates including AND, OR, NOT, XOR, and XNOR are used often in the cryptographic functions of the algorithms. All these functions are good enough of developing any cryptographic algorithm, but as per the present need of randomness features, they often lag behind in exhibiting this randomness in their data processing. Moreover, functions used in cryptography possess some important features like balancedness, non-linearity, resiliency, immunity, correlation and propagation which are to be considered for evaluating the strength of the ciphers and not been evaluated significantly while designing the stream ciphers like RC4. In this paper, we have considered such parameters for RC4 in the integration of functional randomness. The cryptographic feature analysis and the inclusion of true randomness are the major contributions in this paper. For this the paper outlines a key scheduling module for MRC4 and which supports a VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ key scheduling modification using the Symmetric Random Function Generator (SRFG) method [6] . Section II briefly explains the basic functioning of the original RC4 algorithm and summarizes the various attacks on the algorithm. Section III shows the proposed modification in RC4 and explains its cryptographic and randomness features. Section IV covers a security analysis of MRC4 and Section V compares the performance results. Section VI finished with the core conclusions of the work.
II. THE RC4 METHOD
RC4 is a popular and widely accepted stream cipher designed in 1987 by Ron Rivest [1] . Within light-weight cryptography, such with embedded devices, RC4 is still seen to be a powerful stream cipher, especially in terms of its memory footprint, its flexible key size, its energy consumption, and its CPU utilization [29] , [30] . Overall, it uses a key-size with variable length and applies byte-oriented operations with random permutation in order to create a pseudorandom stream. The security base of the algorithm depends on a pseudorandom key scheduling process, with a variable key length of between one to 256 bytes (8 bits to 2,048 bits). This is used to initialize the state vector S. For each encryption/decryption, a byte k is generated that works as a keystream part. This byte is generated by a systematic method from S. Finally, as with most stream ciphers, an XOR operation is used between the plaintext byte and the k byte. The algorithm of the original RC4, and its key scheduling, are illustrated in Figure 1 .
The RC4 stream cipher has been used extensively within network protocols such as SSL, WEP, TLS, and WPA. Though this algorithm has been used widely, RC4 always has faced cryptanalysis attacks due to its several drawbacks [7] , and which has reduced its adoption. Within WEP, the size of the original key in RC4 was limited to 40 bits, and which used a 24-bit Initialization Vector (IV). The small size of the key made it vulnerable to brute force attack, and the small size of the IV caused the same IV value to be rolled-over after a relatively short time. When this roll-over happened, it was then possible to reveal the plaintext [31] .
In [8] , the authors defined a family of related keys for each 2048-bit key, and which differs in one of the byte positions. The keystream generated by RC4 for a key and its related keys are substantially similar. Therefore, it is relatively easy to use a statistical analysis or linear and differential cryptanalysis to achieve the secret key. A statistical analysis of the RC4 keystream generator is also shown in [9] , and where their process uses only 2 30.6 bytes of its outputs and also analyses the distinguisher of 8-bit randomness. Researchers have also identified a number of weak keys against RC4 and which signifies that RC4 is no longer accepted for security processes [10] . Weak keys are used to generate the distinguisher for RC4 and to execute a related key attack on the cipher. It is also shown that a proposed passive ciphertext attack procedure can break any arbitrary long key within practical time complexities. The authors also analysed the Fortuitous states in RC4.
A statistical bias has been identified in the distribution of the first two output bytes of the RC4 keystream generator [11] . This work shows that 2 25 bytes of outputs are sufficient to effectively measure the RC4 outputs from random strings. A cryptanalytic attack that uses the tree representation of RC4 cipher is also analysed [12] . It introduces an abstraction for managing the information about its internal state. A hill-climbing strategy is then used to find out the initial state. The simple complexity of this attack as compared to exhaustive search confirms that RC4 is weak. This attack is derived from a class of table-shuffling ciphers, and where the table entries are permuted by next-state function.
In [13] , the authors present a generalizes framework for differential cryptanalysis on RC4. The differences in the key, or in the keystream patterns, are then used to analyse the bit vectors of the internal state of the cipher and in retrieving that bit sequence. In [14] , the authors analyse the permutation operations which are considered to be non-linear. The theoretical analysis of the work shows that permutation bytes in any stage in key scheduling algorithm of RC4 are biased, and that this bias reveals the secret key eventually. The colliding key problem in RC4 has been described in [15] . These keys disrupt the pseudorandomness and are able to calculate the same initial state, and which eventually outputs the same pseudorandom byte stream. A new state transition sequence of the key scheduling algorithm is shown which is used with a related key pair of an arbitrary fixed length, thus leading to key collision problems. Another key collision work on RC4 has been researched in [16] , and attack on RC4 (n,m) has been shown in [17] . The authors show two attacks: one is based on non-randomness of internal state, and which allows it to be distinguishes from a truly random cipher. Another attack is depending upon low diffusion of bits in the key scheduling of RSA and PRGA algorithms, and recovers all the bytes of the secret key. Empirical correlations among the keystream bytes and the secret key have been studied thoroughly in [18] , and which show that the non-randomness behaviour of RC4 works as a bias and exhibits such relations which are used for cryptanalysis attacks.
A number of improvements to RC4 have been suggested by different researchers. An improved RC4 has been shown in [19] and which uses a new pseudorandom bit generator with two secret keys and three pointers. The key size condition for robustness in RC4 has been analysed in the paper [20] , and a analysis of modified RC4 following the same use of two keys has been shown in [21] . Three enhanced variants of RC4 have been proposed in [22] , and where the authors concentrate on the pseudorandom number generation, rather than the key scheduling. A hybrid chaoticbased approach has been used in [23] for improving the strength of RC4. In [24] , the initial state factorial is used to solve the correlation issue of RC4, and an additional state table is used to remove the correlation between publicly known outputs of the internal state. The same length as that of the state has been used for this table to contain the factorial of initial state elements.
The analysis of the previous work signifies that RC4 suffers from cryptanalysis attacks due mainly to its keystream biasness. Moreover, the collision of keys and the distinguisher generation also create major drawback in this cipher. To mitigate these, we propose the usage of SRFG [6] so that randomness can be strictly provided in key scheduling and no keystream byte can be backtracked to the secret key.
III. MODIFIED RC4 (MRC4) AND ITS FEATURES
The analysis of the literature review exhibits the fact the RC4 faces the cryptanalysis problems due to its key scheduling algorithm. Thus we have modified the first stage of RC4 key scheduling. and where we added SRFG to each byte transferred from K to T. For this, SRFG will get two inputs from two consecutive bytes of K. The bytes in K is considered to be iterative until the completion of bytes of T. For the last byte of T to be generated, the last byte of K (after expanding) and the first byte K is considered as inputs of SRFG. At this time, we have stored the keystream accordingly to bytes for decryption process. The modification has been summarized in Algorithm 1. All the others modules are kept the same and therefore only the modified process is shown in Figure 2 .
We have experimented the key scheduling algorithm (KSA) of RC4 with our previously developed SRFG [6] . It removes the biasness from the keystream bytes. This bias generates cryptanalysis attacks deducing linear or differential relations among the states or keystream bytes and backtracks the secret key. We have explained the important features of the outputs of KSA in MRC4 such as: balancedness; non-linearity; resiliency; propagation criterion; and Algorithm 1 1: procedure Algorithm-1 2: for i = 0 to 255 do 3: if (keylen == 256) then 4: for j = 0 to 255 5:
else 8: for j = 0 to keylen 9: recursively copy k[j] to T [i] 10: end loop 11: end if 12: end loop 13: for i = 0 to 255 do 14:
end loop 16 :
immunity by applying the SRFG. Each byte b i in the initial state space T is comprised of 8 bits and is considered as 8-bit byte vector b in our experimentation.
Consider F 2 as the set of all the functions on two variables input to the SRFG stage in generation of T where all the functions mapping from
considered as the finite field of two elements {0,1} and is any operation on the field F 2 . Any combined function f c ∈ F 2 of five terms (in this proposed work, we have taken the expression length as 5) is expressed as a polynomial and given as:
where,
The output of f c depends on the weight of its input variables. As a result, f c corresponds to a function
is also an 8-bit byte vector and considered as simplified value vector of f c . The established relation between simplified value vector and Arithmetic Normal Form (ANF), can be shown as:
where, λ f (j) , u ∈ F 2 2 and L ∈ Z, j = {1, 2}. X j,N is the two variable elementary polynomial of degree j. The coefficients of ANF of f c is represented by 8 − bit vector,
The functional and mathematical properties of KSA in MRC4 have been shown in following subsections.
A. BALANCEDNESS
The balanced property in the proposed KSA in MRC4 exists if its simplified value vector h c satisfies the following condition:
where is sum over F 2 (5) Inheriting the trivial balancedness feature from SRFG in KSA f c verifies the condition D 1 f c = 1 which actually does not exist for even values of n (here n = 8 for bytes). For any byte vector b, wt (b) = n/2 (where, wt (b) is the weight of byte vector defined as number of 1s in it), we can calculate the D 1 f c as:
As each byte is balanced, the overall bytes in initial states are also balanced. Therefore, this balancedness property helps to prevent attacks depending upon the weight or Hamming distances [25] .
B. NONLINEARITY
The nonlinearity is calculated by the Hamming distance between two affine transformations. For example, two-byte vectors are: b i and b j of 8 bits each:
This property of non-linearity removes the probability of bias and reduces the chances of deducing relations with all 0s or all 1s inputs. Each byte follows this non-linearity to generate the initial state of T .
C. RESILIENCY
The proposed KSA in MRC4 is m-resilient if the output remains balanced when any m input bits are fixed and remaining (8-m) bits are altered in next sequence. The function is more resilient if m is higher. The property of resiliency is related to the weights of the restrictions of the f c to some subspaces.
∀ f c ∈ F 2 and any affine subspace S ⊂ F 2 2 , the restriction of f c to S is the function given as:
The subspace S is spanned by k canonical basis vectors and its supplementary subspace is S. The restrictions of f c to S and to all its cosets are given by b + S where, b ∈ S . Being f c symmetric and balanced, S is represented as: S = s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s k and f a+ S becomes symmetric and balanced too. Moreover, for all s ∈ S, we can write the following:
The simplified value vector and the simplified ANF vector of f a+ S can be deduced from f c as given below.
Proposition 1: For the proposed KSA in MRC4 with m-resiliency factor, two consecutive keystream bytes with 8 bits each have maximum non-linearity of 5. In such cases, the difference between simplified value vectors of the two consecutive bytes of T equals to the sum of the non-linearity of two consecutive bytes b i, b j, in T.
Following the basic properties of SRFG as shown in our previous work [6] , the proposed KSA satisfies the propagation criterion of degree k and order m as the outputs of KSA are represented by affine functions keeping m input bits constant and satisfies the propagation criterion of degree k.
Considering each keystream byte for experimentation. Let f c ∈ F 2 and let b i , b j ∈ F 2 2 , ∀ i, j = 1, 2, .., 256, such that wt (b i ) = wt b j = n 2 . Then, D b i f c and D b j f c are linearly equivalent. This signifies that if we change the input variables with a linear permutation µ of F 2 2 
The permutation µ exists on the variable in a way so that b j = µ(b i ). Since, f c used in KSA is symmetric and balanced, we can have,
Let k be an integer, 1 ≤k ≤n − 1, z ∈ b i = b i 1 , b i 2 , ..., b i n−k and ε k = b n−k+1 + · · · +w n . Then for any z = a + b j with a ∈ S , then we can have the following.
Equation 17 signifies that h c follows the symmetric property. This means that partial derivatives of our proposed KSA outputs are also propagated with the propagation features.
E. IMMUNITY
Correlation immunity and algebraic immunity are examined for the proposed KSA in MRC4. For correlation immunity, considering each of the two input bytes b i as a 8-bit binary vector the outputs are correlation immune if:
The probability distribution must be equal for all the bits and therefore, the output byte b o ∈ T having the following property.
is the matching of output bytes from KSA and its reverse with respect to value 0 and
is the matching of output words from KSA and its reverse with respect to value 1. Following the above property, an interesting feature of our proposed key expansion module has been identified and the proposition has been given as: 
As we have used SRFG to generate the output bytes, the minimum degree is always n 2 . Therefore, the algebraic immunity of the outputs from it is always n 2 which is always optimal. We can rewrite the equation 20 for two consecutive state of T as:
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The analysis of the previous works on RC4 in Section II shows that the cipher suffers from the problem of biased distinguisher and which eventually deduces the relational statistics for identifying the secret key. The biasedness is generated with all the binary zero or all the binary one values of bytes of inputs. Moreover, related key attacks are also responsible for linear and differential cryptanalysis on RC4. Therefore, in the following subsections we have analysed the security features of MRC4 in the above said perspective.
A. RELATED KEY ATTACK ANALYSIS
We focus on how the S-box initialization responds to a single-byte difference in its input. Assume any random key k (i) = k(i) where, k(i) is the original key except when i = t where k(t) = k (t). In this case, j = ( j + S(i) + k(i))mod256 will result in different values of j. If t is close to zero, the resulting S-boxes will be completely different. If t is close to 255, however, the S-boxes will be substantially similar because the first t-1 iterations through the initialization loop have performed exactly the same work. We have used a twiddled key k (t) = k(t)+µ and therefore k (t+1) = k(t+1)−µ, the value of j at i th iteration will be j i = j i + µ and j i+1 will be same as j i . This k' and k are called related keys. With this key-setup, in the initialization phase, the RC4 output for the original key and the related key will proceed in lock step for b i = b i still s i−1 = s i−1 . At this point we define it as derailment of RC4 systems and identical bytes produced by the two keys is defined as the length of the derailment. In our experiment, for two randomly chosen keys -in the initialization phase of the KSA -the probability of two bytes to be similar is given as:
To generalize the above equation for any x bytes of key, the above equation can be re-written as:
The probability of the derailment length of d is calculated as:
The derailment of RC4 is related to the distinguishing attack. A distinguisher is an algorithm which distinguishes a stream of bytes from a perfectly random byte stream. It verifies whether a stream of bytes that has been chosen is according to the uniform distribution. Cryptanalysts try to distinguish between a string generated by an insecure pseudorandom byte generator and one from a perfectly random source. There are different types of distinguishers used by the adversaries as: regular; prefix; and hybrid. In all the cases, the main objective is to identify a two-byte sequence to be same, in order to observe a higher derailment length. But, in our experimentation, we have found that the probability of two bytes getting similar is too small and therefore the distinguishing attack cannot be inferred.
B. LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS
We have followed the bit-advantage concept for analysis of linear attacks. If an attack is executed on an n-bit key and recovers the correct value of the key ranked among the top m out of 2 n possible candidates, the attack obtains an (n − log(m)) -bit advantage over exhaustive search. In such attacks, linear equations are made from the known plaintexts functioning with the ciphertext to get the key bytes. Linear cryptanalysis is common in RC4 as the key bytes are directly XORed with plaintext bytes and key bytes are achievable. But, in MRC4 we have processed KSA with SRFG so that for any two random bytes of keystream, the total key is not going to be deduced. Therefore, we have analysed the linear relation approximation on two related keys rather than on known plaintexts as below.
Following Theorem 2 in the research work [26] , if P s is the probability that a linear attack on an n-bit keystream byte (8 bits here) -with a linear approximation of probability p and with N known related keystream bytes -delivers an m-bit or higher advantage. Assuming that the linear approximation's probability to hold is independent for each key tried and is equal to 1 2 for all wrong keys, we can have:
Now, to calculate the linear approximation of probability p of the attack we have evaluated that whether any two wrong keys k 1 and k 2 are deriving two similar bytes or not. The probability of such similarity has been calculated in Equation 25 . This shows that the success probability P s is also reduced and approximates to 0 if m → n.
Therefore the proposition can be written as: Proposition 3: In MRC4, if P(b i = b i ) → 0 and n-bit random keystream byte attempts to generate an n-bit advantage, the success probability P s = 0.
C. DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS
We concentrate on keys of 256 bits as these keys are very common in wireless implementations. The differential cryptanalysis deduces the output streams that are expected to be the same in the first few bytes even though input has been changed. Generally, this cryptanalysis is a type of chosen plaintext. Therefore, we need to check the probability of getting any two similar cipher text bytes for two chosen plaintext bytes.
Let pt and pt are two chosen plaintext of l bytes with a known difference MRC4 and given as:
Due to the convenience of calculation, we assume that the non-linearity is uniformly distributed among all the bytes of the chosen plaintexts and therefore, from Equation 27 we can write the following:
Following the Equation 22b, the probability of any two ciphertext bytes to be similar can be calculated as:
Assuming a key size of 256 bits (32 bytes) and plaintext size of 64 bytes, we can write from the above equation is:
The above equation shows that using the two chosen plaintext, the probability of two random similar cipher bytes is impractical. Therefore, differential analysis is not possible on our MRC4. From, this analysis, we can infer the following proposition.
Proposition 4: In MRC4, the probability of the two similar ciphertext bytes is inversely proportional to the number of plaintext bytes and inversely proportional to non-linearity and given as:
From the above, we can write:
where k is constant and given as k
S-box information maps the non-zero inputs to any non-zero outputs in the array. For the RC4 with 256 bits, 256 states are defined. Using the SRFG the randomization for temporary state generation T also obtains the randomized bits for every iteration with P(b i = b i ) measured very small. We have compared some of the RC4 versions for the process and measured the active S-boxes in multiple iterations shown in Table 1 .
D. NON-RELATED KEY ATTACKS
In this attack environment, the same data is encrypted several times using the same key, but using a different Initial Value (IV). This is referred to as the standard (non-relatedkey) model, where the IV value is presumed to be under control of the attacker. A plaintext pt is encrypted several times using different initial values V 1 , V 2 , .., V n which are biased and under control of attacker. Assuming the length of the initial values V i are of b bits, and probability of derailment rail identification is approximately zero, the probability of two ciphertexts to be similar can be derived as an extension of linear cryptanalysis and relate key analysis. It is calculated as:
As P(d) → 0 and P(b i = b i ) is small enough for large number of bits sequence, the overall probability of the two ciphertexts to be same also near to zero which signifies that the non-related key attacks are also resistible by the presented MRC4.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have implemented the proposed MRC4 in software with hardware specification as: CPU: 2.6 GHz, i3 6th Gen with 4 GB RAM. MRC4 is developed with Python using cryptographic libraries. The output results are analyzed using R programming and NIST statistical suite. We have compared our experimental results with the original RC4, four extended versions of RC4 [11] , [22] , [32] , [33] and two recent improvements of RC4 [21] , [34] . We have stored the key bytes generated from the keystream generator and we shall consider this as a feature work to deal with key storage process. Note that, only the keystream generation process is only modified in MRC4; however, we have measured the results with the overall process of encryption and decryption. We have varied the key sizes from 64 bits to 2,048 bits in all the performance metrics.
The first comparison is done on the basis features extracted in Section III: non-linearity, balancedness, resiliency, propagation criterion, correlation immunity and algebraic immunity. We have measured the order of the features stated above and compared accordingly as in Table 2 . The comparison results in Table 2 signifies that our proposed modification of keystream generation is efficient in terms of the above said features. We can see from the table that the original RC4 method was lagging behind in acquiring the important features of cryptographic functions and therefore, the attacks as considered in the previous work are executable on this cipher. Better results are noticed in improvement proposed in [21] as compared to original RC4, but still it is not enough for the purpose. Furthermore, the improvement shown in [22] and the other versions of RC4 modifications as in [11] , [32] - [34] show far better results as compared to the previous two algorithms and possess some cryptographic attributes. However, the use of SRFG in the proposed modification has provided improved features and the optimality of balancedness which is useful for preventing bitsum attacks [25] . The high correlation immunity in the proposed MRC4 is advantageous to prevent correlation attacks [27] .
We have compared the computation time for all the algorithms as stated above on the same platform. In this comparison too, we have assumed the time for XORing operation is a constant for both encryption and decryption and therefore not considered in the time consumption calculation. Therefore, Table 3 only compares the time taken (in microseconds) for the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) by varying the key size. The time comparison results show that use of the SRFG in RC4 key scheduling modification is increasing the time consumption in generating the keystream bytes and thus contributing to the trade-off between security and time consumption. The same has also been addressed by the authors in [22] . To support this trade-off and overcome with the security issues, we have also compared the attacks on the algorithms in terms of cost of bits as shown in Table 4 . For this comparison, we have considered 50 plaintexts of 128 bytes each with 128-bit (16-byte) keys. Table 4 describes the fact that the cost of the attacks for our proposed MRC4 is much higher than the other algorithms due to the use of randomness with SRFG in KSA. This signifies that MRC4 is better in terms of security.
The time comparison results show that use of the SRFG in RC4 key scheduling modification is increasing the time consumption in generating the keystream bytes and thus contributing to the trade-off between security and time consumption. The same has also been addressed by the authors in [22] . To support this trade-off and overcome with the security issues, we have also compared the attacks on the algorithms in terms of cost of bits as shown in Table 4 . For this comparison, we have considered 50 plaintexts of 128 bytes each with 128-bit (16-byte) keys. Table 4 describes the fact that the cost of the attacks for our proposed MRC4 is much higher than the other algorithms due to the use of randomness with SRFG in KSA. This signifies that MRC4 is better in terms of security.
Lastly, we have compared two prime evaluation parameters of cryptographic algorithms: confusion and diffusion. According to Shannon's theory [28] , confusion property exhibits the statistical relationship of between the ciphertext and key to be more complex whereas, diffusion property yields the relationship between plaintext and ciphertext such that a single bit change in plaintext must change at least half of the cipher text bits. We have introduced two new metrics, Confusion Index (CI) and Diffusion Index (DI) in this point to have a bounded range of the metric and given as:
key bits × nonlinearity in two ciphertext ciphertext bits DI = nonlinearity in two ciphertext plaintext bits (31) The maximum value of the confusion index in Equation 31 can be ∝ which is not possible in the real-life implementation scenarios as all the cipher text bits cannot be changed for a single bit change in key. If it happens then, it will work as a bias in next state initialization. We have varied the key bits from 64 to 2048 with a fixed plaintext of 128 bytes (1024 bits) and, as an output, we have received 128 bytes (1024bits).
The results are compared with other algorithms as well and shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. From Figure 3 , we can observe the proposed MRC4 is best in providing confusion as compared to others. Jindal et. al. [34] shows an increasing confusion index but drops down after 1024 bits of keysize. The other algorithms are show significantly low confusion index which is not suitable for stream ciphers. Moreover, an interesting behaviour of MRC4 has been observed here. It shows that up to 128-bit keys, the confusion index is almost static and with the key size of 256 bits to 512 bits it increases with a high slope and with higher than 512 bits of keys, confusion index decreases rapidly. This fact signifies that for MRC4 using the key sizes in between of 256 to 512 bits is most efficient. Similarly, Figure 4 shows that original RC4 and the algorithm shown in reference [21] are having very low diffusion property. The algorithm in [22] is having a better diffusion index whereas the modification in RC4 shown in [34] provides good diffusion till near about 512 bits and then degrades the performance with increasing keysize. The other algorithms are having average diffusion but less than that of the our proposed MRC4. Like confusion, here also MRC4 follows a constant diffusion index up to the key size of 256 bits but drastically changes with the use of 512 bits of keys and gets constant after with higher bits of keys. Analysing the behaviour of MRC4 in confusion and diffusion, we can say that the use of 512 bits key is considered to be the most efficient use in MRC4 to get high cryptographic features.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
RC4 has been a popular stream cipher but has been identified with a number of cryptographic weaknesses. It is, though, well matched to light-weight cryptography methods. This paper outlines a solution related to the randomness in key scheduling algorithm of RC4 and uses SRFG. The experimental results show that MRC4 possess a 60% better confusion property and 50% better diffusion as compared to the original RC4 method. The limitation of this paper is about the time taken by the KSA as compared to the state-of-the-art. Therefore, it is confirmed that RC4 is able to provide good security features at the cost of increased time, and which leads to a trade-off between security and time. Ignoring the fact of the time consumption if we consider only the robustness and security features. MRC4 is efficient in all respects of cryptographic attributes and security evaluation. Furthermore, being a symmetric keystream cipher, RC4 uses the single key for both encryption and decryption. In this paper, the keystream bytes are stored separately for decryption in later stage as required. In future work, it should be possible to analysing the trade-off between storing of random keys, the security and the related space complexity.
